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The complexity of cake cuing with unequal shares
A´GNES CSEH, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
TAMA´S FLEINER, Department of Computer Science and Information eory, Budapest University of
Technology and Economics
An unceasing problem of our prevailing society is the fair division of goods. e problem of proportional
cake cuing focuses on dividing a heterogeneous and divisible resource, the cake, among n players who value
pieces according to their own measure function. e goal is to assign each player a not necessarily connected
part of the cake that the player evaluates at least as much as her proportional share.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of proportional division with unequal shares, where each player
is entitled to receive a predetermined portion of the cake. Our main contribution is threefold. First we
present a protocol for integer demands that delivers a proportional solution in fewer queries than all known
algorithms. en we show that our protocol is asymptotically the fastest possible by giving a matching lower
bound. Finally, we turn to irrational demands and solve the proportional cake cuing problem by reducing
it to the same problem with integer demands only. All results remain valid in a highly general cake cuing
model, which can be of independent interest.
1 INTRODUCTION
In cake cuing problems, the cake symbolizes a heterogeneous and divisible resource that shall
be distributed among n players. Each player has her own measure function, which determines
the value of any part of the cake for her. e aim of proportional cake cuing is to allocate each
player a piece that is worth at least as much as her proportional share, evaluated with her measure
function [Steinhaus, 1948]. e measure functions are not known to the protocol.
e efficiency of a fair division protocol can be measured by the number of queries. In the
standard Robertson-Webb model [Robertson and Webb, 1998], two kinds of queries are allowed.
e first one is the cut query, in which a player is asked to mark the cake at a distance from
a given starting point so that the piece between these two is worth a given value to her. e
second one is the eval query, in which a player is asked to evaluate a given piece according to her
measure function.
If shares are meant to be equal for all players, then the proportional share is defined as 1n of
the whole cake. In the unequal shares version of the problem (also called cake cuing with entitle-
ments), proportional share is defined as a player-specific demand, summing up to the value of the
cake over all players. e aim of this paper is to determine the query complexity of proportional
cake cuing in the case of unequal shares. Robertson and Webb [1998] write in their seminal book
“Nothing approaching general theory of optimal number of cuts for unequal shares division has
been given to date. is problem may prove to be very difficult.” We now sele the issue for the
number of queries, the standard measure of efficiency instead of the number of physical cuts.
1.1 Related work
Equal shares Possibly the most famous cake cuing protocol belongs to the class of Divide and
Conquer algorithms. Cut and Choose is a 2-player equal-shares protocol that guarantees propor-
tional shares. It already appeared in the Old Testament, where Abraham divided Canaan to two
equally valuable parts and his brother Lot chose the one he valued more for himself. e first
n-player variant of this algorithm is aributed to Banach and Knaster [Steinhaus, 1948] and it re-
quires O
(
n2
)
queries. Other methods include the continuous (but discretizable) Dubins-Spanier
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protocol [Dubins and Spanier, 1961] and the Even-Paz protocol [Even and Paz, 1984]. e laer
show that their method requires O (n logn) queries at most. e complexity of proportional cake
cuing in higher dimensions has been studied in several papers [Barbanel et al., 2009, Beck, 1987,
Brams et al., 2008, Hill, 1983, Iyer and Huhns, 2009, Segal-Halevi et al., 2017a], in which cuts are
tailored to fit the shape of the cake.
Unequal shares e problem of proportional cake cuing with unequal shares is first men-
tioned by Steinhaus [1948]. Motivated by dividing a leover cake, Robertson and Webb [1998]
define the problem formally and offer a range of solutions for two players. More precisely, they
list cloning players, using Ramsey partitions [McAvaney et al., 1992] and most importantly, the
Cut Near-Halves protocol [Robertson and Webb, 1998]. e last method computes a fair solution
for 2 players with integer demands d1 and d2 in 2⌈log2(d1+d2)⌉ queries. Robertson and Webb also
show how any 2-player protocol can be generalized to n players in a recursive manner.
Irrational demands e case of irrational demands in the unequal shares case is interesting
from the theoretical point of view, but beyond this, solving itmight be necessary, because other pro-
tocols might generate instances with irrational demands. For example, in the maximum-efficient
envy-free allocation problem with two players and piecewise linear measure functions, any opti-
mal solution must be specified using irrational numbers, as Cohler et al. [2011] show. Barbanel
[1996] studies the case of cuing the cake in an irrational ratio between n players and presents an
algorithm that constructs a proportional division. Shishido and Zeng [1999] solve the same prob-
lem with the objective of minimizing the number of resulting pieces. eir protocol is simpler
than that of Barbanel [1996].
Lower bounds e drive towards establishing lower bounds on the complexity of cake cut-
ting protocols is coeval to the cake cuing literature itself [Steinhaus, 1948]. Even and Paz [1984]
conjectured that their protocol is the best possible, while Robertson and Webb explicitly write
that “they would place their money against finding a substantial improvement on the n log2 n
bound” for proportional cake cuing with equal shares. Aer approximately 20 years of no break-
through in the topic, Magdon-Ismail et al. [2003] showed that any protocol must make Ω(n log2 n)
comparisons – but this was no bound on the number of queries. Essentially simultaneously,
Woeginger and Sgall [2007] came up with the lower bound Ω(n log2 n) on the number of queries
for the case where contiguous pieces are allocated to each player. Not much later, this condition
was dropped by Edmonds and Pruhs [2011] who completed the query complexity analysis of pro-
portional cake cuing with equal shares by presenting a lower bound of Ω(n log2 n). Brams et al.
[2011] study the minimum number of actual cuts in the case of unequal shares and prove that n−1
cuts might not suffice – in other words, they show that there is no proportional allocation with
contiguous pieces. However, no lower bound on the number of queries has been known in the
case of unequal shares.
Generalizations in higher dimensions ere are two sets of multiple-dimensional general-
izations of the proportional cake cuing problem. e first group focuses on the existence of a
proportional division, without any constructive proof. e existence can be shown easily using
Lyapunov’s theorem, as stated by Dubins and Spanier [1961] as Corollary 1.1. Berliant et al. [1992]
investigate the existence of envy-free divisions. Dall’Aglio [2001] considers the case of equal shares
and defines a dual optimization problem that allows to compute a proportional solution by mini-
mizing convex functions over a finite dimensional simplex. Complexity issues are not discussed
in these papers, in fact, queries are not even mentioned in them.
e second group of multiple-dimensional generalizations considers problems where certain
geometric parameters are imposed on the cake and the pieces, see Barbanel et al. [2009], Beck
[1987], Brams et al. [2008], Hill [1983], Iyer and Huhns [2009], Segal-Halevi et al. [2017b]. Also,
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some of these have special extra requirements on the output, such as contiguousness or envy-
freeness. ese works demonstrate the interest in various problems in multi-dimensional cake
cuing, for which we define a very general framework.
1.2 Our contribution
We provide formal definitions in Section 2 and present the query analysis of the fastest known
protocol for the n-player proportional cake cuing problem with total demand D in Section 3.
en, in Section 4 we focus on our protocol for the problem, which is our main contribution
in this paper. e idea is that we recursively render the players in two batches so that these
batches can simulate two players who aim to cut the cake into two approximately equal halves.
Our protocol requires only 2 (n − 1) · ⌈log2 D⌉ queries. Other known protocols reach D · ⌈log2 D⌉
and n(n − 1) · ⌈log2 D⌉, thus ours is the fastest procedure that derives a proportional division for
the n-player cake cuing problem with unequal shares. Moreover, our protocol also works on a
highly general cake (introduced in Section 5), extending the traditional notion of the cake to any
finite dimension.
We complement our positive result by showing a lower bound of Ω
(
n · log2 D
)
on the query
complexity of the problem in Section 6. Our proof generalizes, but does not rely on, the lower
bound proof given by Edmonds and Pruhs [2011] for the problem of proportional division with
equal shares. Moreover, our lower bound remains valid in the generalized cake cuing and query
model, allowing a considerably more powerful notion of a query even on the usual, [0, 1] interval
cake.
In Section 7 we turn to irrational demands and solve the proportional cake cuing problem by
reducing it to the same problem with integer demands only. By doing so, we provide a novel and
simple approach to the problem. Moreover, our method works in the generalized query model as
well.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We begin with formally defining our input. Our seing includes a set of players of cardinality
n, denoted by {P1, P2, . . . , Pn}, and a heterogeneous and divisible good, which we refer to as the
cake and project to the unit interval [0, 1]. Each player Pi has a non-negative, absolutely contin-
uous measure function µi that is defined on Lebesgue-measurable sets. We remark that absolute
continuity implies that every zero-measure set has value 0 according to µi as well. In particular,
µi ((a,b)) = µi ([a,b]) for any interval [a,b] ⊆ [0, 1]. Besides measure functions, each player Pi has
a demand di ∈ Z
+, representing that Pi is entitled to receive di/
n∑
j=1
d j ∈]0, 1[ part of the whole cake.
e value of the whole cake is identical for all players, in particular it is the sum of all demands:
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n µi ([0, 1]) = D =
n∑
j=1
d j .
We remark that an equivalent formulation is also used sometimes, where the demands are rational
numbers that sum up to 1, the value of the full cake. Such an input can be transformed into the
above form simply by multiplying all demands by the least common denominator of all demands.
As opposed to this, if demands are allowed to be irrational numbers, then no ratio-preserving
transformation might be able to transform them to integers. at is why the case of irrational
demands is treated separately.
A´gnes Cseh and Tama´s Fleiner 4
e cake [0, 1] will be partitioned into subintervals in the form [x ,y), 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1. A finite
union of such subintervals forms a piece Xi allocated to player Pi . We would like to stress that a
piece is not necessarily connected.
Definition 2.1. A set {Xi }1≤i≤n of pieces is a division of the cake [0, 1] if
⋃
1≤i≤n
Xi = [0, 1] and
Xi ∩ X j = ∅ for all i , j . We call division {Xi }1≤i≤n proportional if µi (Xi ) ≥ di for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In words, proportionality means that each player receives a piece with which her demand is sat-
isfied. We do not consider Pareto optimality or alternative fairness notions such as envy-freeness
in this paper.
We now turn to defining the measure of efficiency in cake cuing. We assume that 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
x ,y ∈ [0, 1] and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Oddly enough, the Robertson-Webb query model was not formalized
explicitly by Robertson and Webb first, but by Woeginger and Sgall [2007], who aribute it to the
earlier two. In their query model, a protocol can ask agents the following two types of queries.
• Cut query (Pi ,α) returns the lemost point x so that µi ([0, x]) = α . In this operation x
becomes a so-called cut point.
• Eval query (Pi , x) returns µi ([0, x]). Here x must be a cut point.
Notice that this definition implies that choosing sides, sorting marks or calculating any other
parameter than the value of a piece are not counted as queries and thus they do not influence the
efficiency of a protocol.
Definition 2.2. e number of queries in a protocol is the number of eval and cut queries until
termination. We denote the number of queries for a n-player algorithm with total demand D by
T (n,D).
e query definition of Woeginger and Sgall is the strictest of the type Robertson-Webb. We
now outline three options to extend the notion of a query, all of which have been used in earlier pa-
pers [Edmonds and Pruhs, 2011, Even and Paz, 1984, Robertson and Webb, 1998,Woeginger and Sgall,
2007] and are also referred to as Robertson-Webb queries.
(1) e query definition of Edmonds and Pruhs. ere is a slightly different and stronger
formalization of the core idea, given by Edmonds and Pruhs [2011] and also used by Procaccia
[2013, 2015]. e crucial difference is that they allow both cut and eval queries to start from
an arbitrary point in the cake.
• Cut query (Pi , x ,α) returns the lemost point y so that µi ([x ,y]) = α or an error
message if no such y exists.
• Eval query (Pi , x ,y) returns µi ([x ,y]).
ese queries can be simulated as trivial concatenations of the queries defined byWoeg-
inger and Sgall. To pin down the starting point x of a cut query (Pi , x ,α)we introduce the
cut point x with the help of a dummy player’s Lebesgue-measure, ask Pi to evaluate the
piece [0, x] and then we cut query with value α ′ = α + µi ([0, x]). Similarly, to generate
an eval query (Pi , x ,y) one only needs to artificially generate the two cut points x and y
and then ask two eval queries of the Woeginger-Sgall model, (Pi , x) and (Pi ,y). We remark
that such a concatenation of Woeginger-Sgall queries reveals more information than the
single query in the model of Edmonds and Pruhs.
(2) Proportional cut query. e term proportional cut query stands for generalized cut
queries of the sort “Pi cuts the piece [x ,y] in ratio a : b”, wherea,b are integers. AsWoegin-
ger and Sgall also note it, two eval queries and one cut query with ratio α = aa+b · µi ([x ,y])
are sufficient to execute such an operation if x ,y are cut points, otherwise five queries
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suffice. Notice that the eval queries are only used by Pi when she calculates α , and their
output does not need to be revealed to any other player or even to the protocol.
(3) Reindexing. When working with recursive algorithms it is especially useful to be able to
reindex a piece [x ,y] so that it represents the interval [0, 1] for Pi . Any further cut and eval
query on [x ,y] can also be substituted by at most five queries on the whole cake. Similarly
as above, there is no need to reveal the result of the necessary eval queries addressed to a
player.
ese workarounds ensure that protocols require asymptotically the same number of queries
in both model formulations, even if reindexing and proportional queries are allowed. We opted
for utilizing all three extensions of the Woeginger-Sgall query model in our upper bound proofs,
because the least restrictive model allows the clearest proofs. Regarding our lower bound proof, it
holds even if we allow a highly general query model including all of the above extensions, which
we define in Section 5.2.
3 KNOWN PROTOCOLS
To provide a base for comparison, we sketch the known protocols for proportional cake cuing
with unequal shares and bound their query complexity.
e most naive approach to the case of unequal shares is the cloning technique, where each
player Pi with demand di is substituted by di players with unit demands. In this way a D-player
equal shares cake cuing problem is generated, which can be solved inO(D log2 D) queries [Even and Paz,
1984].
As Robertson and Webb [1998] point out, any 2-player protocol can be generalized to an n-
player protocol. ey list two 2-player protocols, Cut Near-Halves and the Ramsey Partition Al-
gorithm [McAvaney et al., 1992] and also remark that for 2 players, Cut Near-Halves is always at
least as efficient as Ramsey Partition Algorithm. erefore, we restrict ourselves to analyzing the
complexity of the generalized Cut Near-Halves protocol.
Cut Near-Halves is a simple procedure, in which the cake of value D is repeatedly cut in ap-
proximately half by players P1 and P2 with demands d1 ≤ d2 as follows. P1 cuts the cake into two
near-halves, more precisely, in ratio ⌊ D2 ⌋ : ⌈
D
2 ⌉. en, P2 picks a piece that she values at least as
much as P1. is piece is awarded to P2 and her claim is reduced accordingly, by the respective
near-half value of the cake. In the next round, the same is repeated on the remaining part of the
cake, and so on, until d1 or d2 is reduced to zero. Notice that the cuer is always the player with
the lesser current demand, and thus this role might be swapped from round to round.
e recursiven-player protocol of Robertson andWebb runs as follows. We assume thatk−1 < n
players, P1, P2, . . . , Pk−1, have already divided thewhole cake of valueD = d1+d2+. . .+dn . e next
player Pk then challenges each of the first k −1 players separately to redistribute the piece already
assigned to them. In these rounds, Pk claims
dk
d1+d2+...+dk−1
part of each piece. is generates k − 1
rounds of the Cut Near-Halves protocol, each with 2 players. Notice that this protocol tends to
assign a highly fractured piece of cake to every player.
e following theorem summarizes the results known about the complexity of the 2-player and
n-player versions of the Cut Near-Halves protocol.
Theorem 3.1 (Robertson and Webb [1998]). e 2-player Cut Near-Halves protocol with de-
mands d1,d2 requiresT (2) = 2⌈log2(d1 +d2)⌉ queries at most. e recursive n-player version is finite.
Here we give an estimate for the number of queries of the recursive protocol.
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Theorem 3.2. e number of queries in the recursive n-player Cut Near-Halves protocol is at most
T (n,D) =
n−1∑
i=1
[
2i ·
⌈
log2
( i+1∑
j=1
d j
)⌉]
≤ n(n − 1) · ⌈logD⌉.
Proof. e first round consists of players P1 and P2 sharing the cake using 2⌈log2 (d1 + d2)⌉
queries. e second round then has two 2-player runs, each of them requiring 2⌈log2 (d1 + d2 + d3)⌉
queries. In general, the ith round terminates aer i · 2⌈log2
(i+1∑
j=1
d j
)
⌉ queries at most. e number
of rounds is n − 1. Now we add up the total number of queries.
n−1∑
i=1
[
2i ·
⌈
log2
( i+1∑
j=1
d j
)⌉]
≤
n−1∑
i=1
[
2i ·
⌈
log2
( n∑
j=1
d j
)⌉]
=
n−1∑
i=1
[
2i ·
⌈
log2 D
⌉]
= n(n − 1) · ⌈logD⌉

e following example proves that the calculated bound can indeed be reached asymptotically
in instances with an arbitrary number of players.
Example 3.3. e estimation for the query number is asymptotically sharp if
⌈
log2
(i+1∑
j=1
d j
)⌉
=⌈
log2 D
⌉
holds for at least a fixed portion of all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, say, for the third of them. is is
easy to reach if n is a sufficiently large power of 2 and all but one players have demand 1, while
there is another player with demand 2. Notice that this holds for every order for the agents. If one
sticks to a decreasing order of demand when indexing the players, then not only asymptotic, but
also strict equality can be achieved by seing d1 much larger than all other demands.
4 OUR PROTOCOL
In this section, we present a simple and elegant protocol that beats all three above mentioned
protocols in query number. Our main idea is that we recursively render the players in two batches
so that these batches can simulate two players who aim to cut the cake into two approximately
equal halves. For nowwework with the standard cake and query model defined in Section 2. Later,
in Section 5.3 we will show how our protocol can be extended to a more general cake. We remind
the reader that cuing near-halves means to cut in ratio ⌊ D2 ⌋ : ⌈
D
2 ⌉.
To ease the notation we assume that the players are indexed so that when they mark the near-
half of the cake, the marks appear in an increasing order from 1 to n. In the subsequent rounds,
we reindex the players to keep this property intact. Based on these marks, we choose “the middle
player”, this being the player whose demand reaches the near-half of the cake when summing
up the demands in the order of marks. is player cuts the cake and each player is ordered to
the piece her mark falls to. e middle player is cloned if necessary so that she can play on both
pieces. e protocol is then repeated on both generated subinstances, with adjusted demands. In
the subproblem, the players’ demands are according to the ratios listed in the pseudocode.
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0 1P3P2P1
2:3
1 1 12
0 10 1P1 P2 P2 P3
1:21:1
1 1
P1 P2 P2 0 1P2P3
1:1
P1 P2 P2 P3 P2
Fig. 1. The steps performed by our algorithm on Example 4.1. The colored intervals are the pieces already
allocated to a player.
Proportional division with unequal shares
Each player marks the near-half of the cake X .
Sort the players according to their marks.
Calculate the smallest index j such that ⌊ D2 ⌋ ≤
∑j
i=1 di =: a.
Cut the cake in two along Pj ’s mark.
Define two instances of the same problem and solve them recursively.
(1) Players P1, P2, . . . , Pj share piece X1 on the le. Demands are set to
d1,d2 . . . ,d j−1,d j−a+⌊
D
2 ⌋, while measure functions are set to µi ·⌊
D
2 ⌋/µi (X1),
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j .
(2) Players Pj , Pj+1, . . . , Pn share piece X2 = X \ X1 on the right. Demands
are set to a − ⌊ D2 ⌋,d j+1,d j+2, . . . ,dn , while measure functions are set to µi ·
⌈D2 ⌉/µi (X2), for all j ≤ i ≤ n.
Example 4.1. We present our protocol on an example with n = 3. Every step of the protocol is
depicted in Figure 1. Let d1 = 1,d2 = 3,d3 = 1. Since D = 5 is odd, all players mark the near-half of
the cake in ratio 2:3. e cake is then cut at P2’s mark, since d1 < ⌊
D
2 ⌋, but d1+d2 ≥ ⌊
D
2 ⌋. e first
subinstance will consist of players P1 and P2, both with demand 1, whereas the second subinstance
will have the second copy of player P2 alongside P3 with demands 2 and 1, respectively. In the first
instance, both players mark half of the cake and the one who marked it closer to 0 will receive the
lemost piece, while the other player is allocated the remaining piece. e players in the second
instance mark the cake in ratio 1 : 2. Suppose that the player demanding more marks it closer to
0. e lemost piece is then allocated to her and the same two players share the remaining piece
in ratio 1 : 1. e player with the mark on the le will be allocated the piece on the le, while the
other players takes the remainder of the piece. ese rounds require 3+ 2+ 2+ 2 = 9 proportional
cut queries and no eval query.
Theorem 4.2. Our “Protocol for proportional division with unequal shares” terminates with a pro-
portional division.
Proof. We provide detailed calculations for the first subinstance only, because analogous cal-
culations can easily be obtained for the second subinstance. First we observe that d j −a+ ⌊D/2⌋ =
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⌊D/2⌋ −
∑j−1
1 di is positive by the definition of j . Now we have to ensure that the subinstance is
generated in such a manner that all players evaluate the full cakeX1 of the first subinstance equally
and to the sum of all their demands. In the case of the first subinstance, the sum of demands is∑j
i=1 di − a + ⌊
D
2 ⌋ = ⌊
D
2 ⌋. is will be the measure of the cake X1 for all players. To achieve this,
µ1, µ2, . . . , µ j need to be adjusted. Each µi will become in this subinstance
µi1 = µi ·
⌊ D2 ⌋
µi (X1)
.
If Pi , 1 ≤ i < j receives a piece of worth di , then in the original instance, it is of worth
di ·
µi (X1)
⌊ D2 ⌋
≥ di ,
because µi (X1) ≥ µ j (X1) = ⌊
D
2 ⌋, due to the cuing rule in our protocol. With this we have shown
that every player appearing only in the first subinstance is guaranteed to gain her proportional
share. An analogous proof works for players Pj+1, Pj+2, . . . , Pn . e last step is to show that Pj
collects her proportional share from the two subinstances.
e only player whose measure function certainly need not be adjusted is Pj . It is because
µ j (X1) = ⌊
D
2 ⌋, thus µ j1 = µ j ·
⌊ D2 ⌋
µ j (X1)
= µ j . erefore, if Pj receives her proportional shared j−a+⌊
D
2 ⌋
and a− ⌊ D2 ⌋ in the two subinstances, then in the original instance her piece is worth d j at least. 
Having shown its correctness, we now present our estimation for the number of queries our
protocol needs.
Theorem 4.3. For any 2 ≤ n and n < D, the number of queries in our n-player protocol on a cake
of total value D is T (n,D) ≤ 2(n − 1) · ⌈log2 D⌉.
Proof. If n = 2, then our algorithm simulates the Cut Near-Halves algorithm—except that it
uses cut queries exclusively—and according to eorem 3.1 it requires 2⌈log2 D⌉ queries at most.
is matches the formula stated in eorem 4.3. From this we prove by induction. For n > 2, the
following recursion formula corresponds to our rules.
T (n,D) = n + max
1≤i≤n
{
T (i, ⌊
D
2
⌋) +T (n − i + 1, ⌈
D
2
⌉)
}
We now substitute our formula into the right side of this expression.
n + max
1≤i≤n
{
T (i, ⌊
D
2
⌋) +T (n − i + 1, ⌈
D
2
⌉)
}
=
n + max
1≤i≤n
{
2(i − 1)⌈log2 ⌊
D
2
⌋⌉ + 2(n − i)⌈log2 ⌈
D
2
⌉⌉
}
≤ (∗)
n + max
1≤i≤n
{
2(i − 1)(⌈log2 D⌉ − 1) + 2(n − i)(⌈log2 D⌉ − 1)
}
=
n + 2(n − 1)(⌈log2 D⌉ − 1) =
−n + 2 + 2(n − 1)⌈log2 D⌉ ≤
2(n − 1) · ⌈log2 D⌉ = T (n,D)
e inequality marked by (∗) is trivially correct if D is even. For odd D, we rely on the fact that
log2 D cannot be an integer.
⌈log2 ⌊
D
2
⌋⌉ ≤ ⌈log2 ⌈
D
2
⌉⌉ = ⌈log2
D + 1
2
⌉ = ⌈log2 (D + 1)−log2 2⌉ = ⌈log2 (D + 1)⌉−1 = ⌈log2 D⌉−1
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
With a query number ofO(n log2 D), our protocol is more efficient than all known protocols. We
will now point out a further essential difference in fairness when comparing to the fastest known
protocol before our result, the generalized Cut Near-Halves. Our protocol treats players equally,
while the generalized Cut Near-Halves does not. Equal treatment of players is a clear advantage
if one considers the perception of fairness from the point of view of a player.
We remark that our protocol is not truthful, which can be illustrated on a simple example. Take
the 2-player equal shares case with nonzero measure functions on any nonzero measure interval.
If the player whose mark is at the le knows the measure function of the other player, she can
easily manipulate the outcome by marking the half of the cake just before the mark of the other
player. As a result, her piece will be larger than what she receives if she reports the truth, unless
their measure functions are special.
Remark 4.4. In the “Protocol for proportional division with unequal shares”
• each player answers the exact same queries as the other players in the same round and same
subinstance;
• no player is asked to disclose the outcome of an eval query.
Proof. In any subinstance, our protocol asks each player to answer the same proportional cut
query, namely cuing the current cake to near-halves. Eval queries in these proportional queries
are only utilized as technical workarounds to determine the value of the piece that plays the cake
in the current subinstance. eir result is never revealed to any other player or even the protocol
itself. e only outcome of the proportional cut query is a mark at the near-half of the current
cake. Moreover, there is no difference in the role of the players when queries are asked, and no
player is doomed to receive her exact share, like the cuer in Cut-and-Choose. If we consider
Cut-Near-Halves, being the cuer in the first round is the most undesired role, followed by being
a cuer in the second round, and so on. Our protocol forgoes this differentiation between the
players, since it addresses the same queries to each player in a round, and the cake will be cut at
the mark of the player whose demand happens to reach ⌊ D2 ⌋ when the demands are summed up
in order of the marks on the cake.

e generalized Cut Near-Halves protocol fails to satisfy both of the above points. It addresses
both eval and cut queries to players and treats players differently based on which type of query
they got. In the 2-player version of Cut Near-Halves, only one player marks the cake and the
other player uses an eval query to choose a side. is enables the second player to have a chance
for a piece strictly beer than half of the cake, while the first player is only entitled for her exact
proportional share and has no chance to receive more than that. Besides this, the player who is
asked to evaluate a piece might easily speculate that she was offered the piece because the other
player cut it off the cake.
However, the remark is true for the Even-Paz protocol for proportional division with equal
shares, which can be utilized in our problem through the cloning technique. As mentioned in
Section 3, it needs O(D log2 D) proportional cut queries. e more efficient generalized Cut Near-
Halves protocol only needs O(n2 log2 D) queries, but it treats players differently. Our protocol
adheres to the equal treatment of players principle and beats both protocols in efficiency.
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5 GENERALIZATIONS
In this section we introduce a far generalization of cake cuing, where the cake is a measurable
set in arbitrary finite dimension and cuts are defined by a monotone function. At the end of the
section we prove that even in the generalized seing, O(n log2 D) queries suffice to construct a
proportional division.
5.1 A general cake definition
Our players remain {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} with demands di ∈ Z
+, but the cake is now a Lebesgue-
measurable subset X of Rk such that 0 < λ(X ) < ∞. Each player Pi has a non-negative, absolutely
continuous measure function µi defined on the Lebesgue-measurable subsets of X . An important
consequence of this property is that for every Z ⊆ X , µi (Z ) = 0 if and only if λ(Z ) = 0. e value
of the whole cake is identical for all players, in particular it is the sum of all demands:
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n µi (X ) = D =
n∑
j=1
d j .
A measurable subset Y of the cake X is called a piece. e volume of a piece Y is the value λ(Y )
taken by the Lebesgue-measure on Y . e cake X will be partitioned into pieces X1, . . . ,Xn .
Definition 5.1. A set {Xi }1≤i≤n of pieces is a division of X if
⋃
1≤i≤n
Xi = X and Xi ∩X j = ∅ holds
for all i , j . We call division {Xi }1≤i≤n proportional if µi (Xi ) ≥ di holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We will show in Section 5.3 that a proportional division always exists.
5.2 A stronger query definition
e more general cake clearly requires a more powerful query notion. Cut and eval queries are
defined on an arbitrary piece (i.e. measurable subset) I ⊆ X . Beyond this, each cut query specifies
a value α ∈ R+ and a monotone mapping f : [0, λ(I )] → 2I (representing a moving knife) such
that f (x) ⊆ f (y) and λ(f (x)) = x holds for every 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ λ(I ).
• Eval query (Pi , I ) returns µi (I ).
• Cut query (Pi , I , f ,α) returns an x ≤ λ(I )with µi (f (x)) = α or an error message if such an
x does not exist.
As queries involve an arbitrary measurable subset I of X , our generalized queries automatically
cover the generalization of the previously discussed Edmonds-Pruhs queries, proportional queries
and reindexing. If we restrict our aention to the usual unit interval cake [0, 1], generalized queries
open up a number of new possibilities for a query, as Example 5.2 shows.
Example 5.2. On the unit interval cake the following rules qualify as generalized queries.
• Evaluate an arbitrary measurable set.
• Cut a piece of value α surrounding a point x so that x is the midpoint of the cut piece.
• For disjoint finite sets A and B, cut a piece Z of value α such that Z contains the ε-
neighborhood of A and avoids the ε-neighborhood of B for a maximum ε .
• Determine x such that the union of intervals [0, x], [ 1n ,
1
n + x], . . . , [
n−1
n ,
n−1
n + x] is of
value α .
e new notions also allow us to define cuts on a cake in higher dimensions.
Example 5.3. Defined on the generalized cakeX ⊆ Rk , the following rules qualify as generalized
queries.
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• Evaluate an arbitrary measurable set.
• Cut a piece of value α of piece I so that the cut is parallel to a given hyperplane.
• Multiple cut queries on the same piece I ⊂ R2: one player always cuts I along a horizontal
line, the other player cuts the same piece along a vertical line.
5.3 The existence of a proportional division
Our algorithm “Proportional division with unequal shares” in Section 4 extends to the above de-
scribed general seing and hence proves that a proportional division always exists.
Theorem 5.4. For any 2 ≤ n and n < D, the number of generalized queries in our n-player protocol
on the generalized cake of total value D is T (n,D) ≤ 2(n − 1) · ⌈log2 D⌉.
Proof. e proof of eorem 3.1 carries over without essential changes, thus we only discuss
the differences here. First we observe that proportional queries in ratio a : b can still be substi-
tuted by a constant number of eval and cut queries. In the generalized model, proportional query
(Pi , I , f ,a,b) returns x ≤ λ(I ) such that b · µi (f (x)) = a · µi (I \ f (x)). Similarly as before, Pi first
measures I by a single eval query and then uses the cut query (Pi , I , f ,α) with α =
a
a+b
· µi (I ). In
the first round of our generalized algorithm, all players are asked to cut the cake X in near-halves
using the same f function. en Pj is calculated, just as in the simpler version and we cut X into
the two near-halves according to Pj ’s f -cut and clone Pj if necessary. Due to the monotonicity of
f , this sorts each player to a piece she values at least as much as the full demand on all players
sorted to that piece. Subsequent rounds are played in the same manner.
e query number for n = 2 follows from the fact that each of the two players are asked a pro-
portional cut query in every round until recursively halving ⌈D2 ⌉ reaches 1, which means ⌈log2 D⌉
queries in total. e recursion formula remains intact in the generalized model, and thus the query
numberT (n,D) = 2(n − 1)⌈log2 D⌉ too. 
6 THE LOWER BOUND
In this section, we prove our lower bound on the number of queries any deterministic protocol
needs tomakewhen solving the proportional cake cuing problemwith unequal shares. is result
is valid in two relevant seings: (1) on the [0, 1] cake with Robertson-Webb or with generalized
queries, (2) on the general cake and queries introduced in Section 5.
e lower bound proof is presented in two steps. In Section 6.1 we define a single-player cake-
cuing problemwhere the goal is to identify a piece of small volume and positive value for the sole
player. For this problem, we design an adversary strategy and specify the minimum volume of the
identified piece as a function of the number of queries asked. In Section 6.2 we turn to the problem
of proportional cake cuing with unequal shares. We show that in order to allocate each player
a piece of positive value, at least Ω(n logD) queries must be addressed to the players—otherwise
the allocated pieces overlap.
6.1 The single-player problem
We define our single-player problem on a generalized cake of valueD, a player P and her unknown
measure function µ . e aim is to identify a piece of positive value according to µ by asking queries
from P . e answers to these queries come from an adversary strategy we design. We would like
to point out that the single-player thin-rich game of Edmonds and Pruhs [2011] defined on the
unit interval cake has a different goal. ere, the player needs to receive a piece that has value
not less than 1 and width at most 2. Moreover, their proof for the n-player problem is restricted to
instances with n = 2 · 3ℓ, ℓ ∈ Z+, whereas ours is valid for any n ∈ Z+.
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Fig. 2. The crumble partition aer two queries in Example 6.1. We marked each of the 6 crumbles by a
different color in the boom picture.
In our single-player problem, a set of queries reveals information on the value of some pieces
of the cake. Each generalized eval query (P, I ) partitions the cake into two pieces; I and X \ I . An
executed cut query (P, I , f ,α) with output x partitions the cake into three; f (x), I \ f (x) and X \ I .
To each step of a protocol we define the currently smallest building blocks of the cake, which we
call crumbles. Two points of X belong to the same crumble if and only if they are in the same
partition in all queries asked so far. At start, the only crumble is the cake itself and every new
query can break an existing crumble into more crumbles. More precisely, q queries can generate
3q crumbles at most. Crumbles at any stage of the protocol partition the entire cake. e exact
value of a crumble is not necessarily known to the protocol and no real subset of a crumble can
have a revealed value. As a maer of fact, the exact same information are known about the value
of any subset of a crumble.
Example 6.1. In Figure 2 we illustrate an example for crumbles on the unit interval cake aer
two queries. e upper picture depicts a cut query defined on the green set I . It generates a piece
of value α so that it contains the ε-neighborhood of points A1,A2,A3 for maximum ε . is piece is
marked red in the figure and it is a crumble. e second crumble at this point is the remainder of I
(marked in green only), while the third crumble is the set of points in black. ese three crumbles
are illustrated in the second picture. e second query evaluates the blue piece in the third picture.
It cuts the existing crumbles into 6 crumbles in total, as depicted in the boom picture.
We now proceed to construct an adversary strategy that bounds the volume of any crumble C
with µ(C) > 0. Our adversary can actually reveal more information than asked; we allow her to
disclose the value of each crumble in the cake. When a query is asked, the answer is determined
based on the parameters of the query and the current set of crumbles, which we denote by C.
Together with the answer to the query, the adversary also specifies the new set of crumbles Cnew
together with µ(Cnew ) for eachCnew ∈ Cnew . In the next query, this Cnewwill serve as the current
set of crumbles C. e adversary answers the queries in accordance to the following rules, which
are also stated in a pseudocode below.
• eval query (C, I )
is query changes the structure of the crumble set C in such a way that each crumble
C ∈ C is split into exactly two new crumbles C ∩ I and C \ I , both of which might be
empty (lines 1-2). If the part inside the crumble is at least as large as the other part, then
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the adversary assigns the full vale ofC to C ∩ I (lines 3-5). Otherwise, the outer partC \ I
will get the entire value (lines 6-8). e answer to the eval query is the total value of new
crumbles that lie in I (line 11).
• cut query (C, I , f ,α)
Each cut query is executed in two rounds. In the first round (lines 12-22) we define new
crumbles C \ I (line 13) and intermediate crumbles C ∩ I (line 14) for all crumbles C ∈ C.
If λ(C ∩ I ) ≥ 2/3 · λ(C) then C ∩ I inherits the entire value of C (lines 15-17), otherwise
C \ I carries all the value of C (lines 18-20). e new crumbles are set aside until the next
query arrives, while the intermediate crumbles will be the crumbles of the second round
(lines 23-45).
If the total value of these intermediate crumbles is less than α , then an error message
is returned indicating that I is not large enough to be cut off a piece of value α (lines 23-
24). Otherwise, for each intermediate crumbleCinti we define the value xi for which f (xi )
halves Cinti in volume (lines 26-28). We then reorder the indices of intermediate crumbles
according to these xi values (line 29). Now we find the index k for which
∑k−1
i=1 µ(C
int
i ) <
α ≤
∑k
i=1 µ(C
int
i ).
e set of new crumbles will now be completed by adding sets
{
Cinti ∩ f (xk )
}
and{
Cinti \ f (xk )
}
to it (lines 31-32). e value of these new crumbles is specified depending
on the index i of Cinti . If i < k , then the crumble in f (xk ) inherits the full value of the
intermediate crumble (lines 34-36). If i > k , then the crumble outside of f (xk ) inherits the
value of the intermediate crumble (lines 37-39). Finally, for i = k , the crumble inside f (xk )
receives all of α that has not been assigned to new crumbles inside f (xk ) with a smaller
index (line 41). Aer this, the crumble outside of f (xk ) gets the remainder of µ(C
int
k
)
(line 42). At last, the algorithm returns x = xk (line 44).
Once all queries have been answered according to the above rules, the player is allocated a
piece Z ⊆ X . e adversary specifies µ(Z ) as the total value of those crumbles that are subsets
of Z .
Having described and demonstrated our adversary strategy, we now turn to proving our key
lemma on the volume of pieces that carry a positive value.
Lemma 6.2. Aer q queries in the single-player problem, the volume of any piece with positive
value is at least D3q .
Proof. Due to the last rule of the adversary strategy, the volume of any piece with positive
value is bounded from below by the volume of any crumble with positive value. We will now
argue that eval and cut queries assign positive value to crumbles whose volume is at least a third
of the volume of the previous crumble.
At the very beginning of the protocol, for q = 0, the only crumble is X itself, with volume D
30
.
Eval queries assign positive value to crumbles that are at least as large as half of the previous
crumble they belonged to prior to the query. If a new crumble with positive value was created in
the first round of a cut query, then its volume was at least one third of a previous crumble (lines 13
and 20). Otherwise, the new crumble with positive value was an intermediate crumbleCinti in the
second round. e first round of our algorithm assigns positive value to an intermediate crumble
only if it was at least two-thirds of the old crumble in the input of the cut query (lines 14-15). is
round will now cut Cinti into two new crumbles (line 32). If i , k , then the larger of these will
inherit the value of the intermediate crumble (lines 35 and 39). Otherwise, if i = k , then Cinti is
cut into exact halves (lines 41-42). All in all, new crumbles that are assigned a positive value in
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ALGORITHM 1: Adversary strategy
Evalqery (C, I )
1 for ∀C ∈ C do
2 Cnew ← Cnew ∪{C ∩ I }∪{C \ I }
3 if λ(C ∩ I ) ≥ 12λ(C) then
4 µ(C ∩ I ) ← µ(C)
5 µ(C \ I ) ← 0
6 else
7 µ(C ∩ I ) ← 0
8 µ(C \ I ) ← µ(C)
9 end
10 end
11 return
∑
Cnew ∈Cnew ,Cnew ⊆I µ(Cnew )
Cut qery (C, I , f ,α)
12 for ∀C ∈ C do
13 Cnew ← Cnew ∪ {C \ I }
14 Cint ← Cint ∪ {C ∩ I }
15 if λ(C ∩ I ) ≥ 23λ(C) then
16 µ(C ∩ I ) ← µ(C)
17 µ(C \ I ) ← 0
18 else
19 µ(C ∩ I ) ← 0
20 µ(C \ I ) ← µ(C)
21 end
22 end
23 if
∑
C int ∈Cint µ(C
int ) < α then
24 return error
25 else
26 for ∀Cinti ∈ C
int do
27 find xi ∈ R so that λ(C
int ∩ f (xi )) =
1
2λ(C
int
i )
28 end
29 reorder [i] in Cinti so that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . .
30 find k ∈ Z so that
∑k−1
i=1 µ(C
int
i ) < α ≤
∑k
i=1 µ(C
int
i )
31 for ∀Cinti ∈ C
int do
32 Cnew ← Cnew ∪
{
Cinti ∩ f (xk )
}
∪
{
Cinti \ f (xk )
}
33 end
34 if i < k then
35 µ(Cinti ∩ f (xk )) ← µ(C
int
i )
36 µ(Cinti \ f (xk )) ← 0
37 else if i > k then
38 µ(Cinti ∩ f (xk )) ← 0
39 µ(Cinti \ f (xk )) ← µ(C
int
i )
40 else
41 µ(Cint
k
∩ f (xk )) ← α −
∑k−1
i=1 µ(C
int
i )
42 µ(Cint
k
\ f (xk )) ← µ(C
int
k
) +
∑k−1
i=1 µ(C
int
i ) − α
43 end
44 return xk
45 end
the second round are of volume at least half of two-thirds of the volume of the original crumble
in the input of the query. 
6.2 The n-player problem
We now place our single-player problem into the framework of the original problem. e instance
we construct has c1n players whose demand sums up to c2n, where c1 and c2 are arbitrary constants
between 0 and 1. We call these players humble, because their total demand is modest compared to
the number of them. e remaining (1−c1)n players share a piece of worth D −c2n. ese players
are greedy, because their total demand is large. e simplest such instance is where n − 1 humble
players have demand 1, and the only greedy player has demand D − (n − 1). We fix the measure
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function of every greedy player to be the Lebesgue-measure. is enforces humble players to share
a piece of volume c2D among themselves. Lemma 6.2 guarantees that aer qi queries addressed
to Pi , the volume of any piece carrying positive value for Pi is at least
D
3qi . We now sum up the
volume of the pieces allocated to humble players in any proportional division.
c1n∑
i=1
D
3qi
≤ c2n
We divide both sides by c1nD.
1
c1n
c1n∑
i=1
3−qi ≤
c2
c1D
For the le side of this inequality, we use the well known inequality for the arithmetic and geo-
metric means of non-negative numbers.
c1n
√
3
−
∑c1n
i1
qi ≤
c2
c1D
Taking the logarithm of both sides leads to the following.
1
c1n
(
−
c1n∑
i1
qi
)
≤ log3
c2
c1
− log3 D
With this, we have arrived to a lower bound on the number of queries.
c1n∑
i1
qi ≥ c1n
(
log3 D + log3
c1
c2
)
∼ Ω(n log3 D)
is proves that one needs Ω(n log3 D) queries to derive a proportional division for the humble
players in the instance. Moreover, if c1 and c2 are known, amore accurate bound can be determined
using our formula c1n
(
log3 D − log3 c2 + log3 c1
)
. is suggests that the problem becomes harder
to solve if the c1n humble players vastly outnumber the greedy players. In the c1n = n − 1 case we
mentioned earlier, the query number is at least (n − 1) log3 D.
We can now conclude our theorem on the lower bound.
Theorem 6.3. To construct a proportional division in an n-player unequal shares cake cuing
problem with demands summing up to D one needs Ω(n logD) queries.
7 IRRATIONAL DEMANDS
In this section we consider the case when some demands are irrational numbers. Apart from
this, our seing is exactly the same as before. Even though two direct protocols have been pre-
sented for the problem of proportional cake cuing with irrational demands [Barbanel, 1996,
Shishido and Zeng, 1999], we feel that our protocol sheds new light to the topic. e complex-
ity of all known protocols for irrational shares falls into the same category: finite but unbounded.
Shishido and Zeng [1999] present a protocol that is claimed to be simpler than the one of Barbanel
[1996]. First they present a 2-player protocol, in which one player marks a large number of pos-
sibly overlapping intervals that are worth the same for her. e other player then chooses one
of these so that it satisfies her demand. e authors then refer to the usual inductive method to
the case of n players, in which the n-th player shares each of the n − 1 pieces the other players
have already obtained. is procedure is cumbersome compared to our protocol that reduces the
problem to one with rational demands or decreases the number of players. Moreover, our method
works on our generalized cake and query model.
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Let us choose an arbitrary piece A ⊆ X such that µi (A) > 0 for all players Pi . If the players
share A and X \ A in two separate instances, both in their original ratio d1 : d2 : . . . : dn , then the
two proportional divisions will give a proportional d1 : d2 : . . . : dn division of X itself. Assume
now that µi (A) < µ j (A) for some players Pi and Pj , and some piece A ⊆ X . When generating
the two subinstances on A and X \ A, we reduce di on A to 0 and increase it in return on X \ A
and and swap the roles for d j , increasing it on A and decreasing it on X \ A. e first generated
instance thus has n − 1 players with irrational demands, while the second instance has n players
with irrational demands. We will show in Lemma 7.2 that if we set the right new demands in these
instances, the two proportional divisions deliver a proportional division of X . e key point we
prove in Lemma 7.3, which states that the demands in the second subinstance sum up to slightly
below all players’ evaluation of X \ A. Redistributing the slack as extra demand among players
gives us the chance to round the demands up to rational numbers in the second subinstance and
keep proportionality in the original instance. Iteratively breaking up the instances into an instance
with fewer players and an instance with rational demands leads to a set of instances with rational
demands only.
We now describe our protocol in detail. Without loss of generality we can assume that d1 ≤
d2 ≤ . . . ≤ dn . As a first step, P1 answers the cut query with x = d1 and I = X . We denote the
piece in f (d1) byA and ask all players to evaluate A. Let Pj be one of the players whose evaluation
is the highest. Notice that µ j (A) ≥ d1, because µ1(A) = d1. We distinguish two cases from here.
(1) If µ j (A) = d1, then µi (A) ≤ d1 for all players. We allocate A to P1 and continue with an
instance I1 with n − 1 players having the same demands as before. e measure functions
need to be normalized to D−d1
D−µi (A)
· µi for all i , 1 so that all players of I1 evaluate X \A to
D − d1.
(2) Otherwise, µ j (A) = d1 + ε , where ε > 0. We generate instances I2a and I2b .
(a) In the first instance I2a , the cake is A, P1’s demand is 0, Pj ’s demand is d j +d1, while all
other players keep their original di demand. In order to make all players evaluate the
full cake to the sum of their demands D, measure functions are modified to D
µi (A)
· µi .
(b) In the second instance I2b , the cake is X \A, P1’s demand is d1 +
d 21
D−d1
, Pj ’s demand is
d j −
d1(d1+ε )
D−(d1+ε )
, while the original di demands are kept for all other players. In order to
make all players evaluate the full cake to D, we set D
D−µi (A)
· µi .
Proportional division with irrational demands
P1 marks d1 → A. All players evaluate A. Pj has the highest evaluation.
If µ j (A) = d1, then allocate A to P1 and
continue with n − 1 players on I1.
Otherwise µ j (A) = d1 + ε . Define
two instances I2a and I2b . While I2a
hasn−1 players, demands in I2b sum up
to below D and thus can be rationalized.
I1 I2a I2b
cake X \ A A X \ A
d1 0 0 d1 +
d 21
D−d1
d j d j d j + d1 d j −
d1(d1+ε )
D−(d1+ε )
di di di di
µi
D−d1
D−µi (A)
µi
D
µi (A)
µi
D
D−µi (A)
µi
Lemma 7.1. A proportional division in I1 extends to a proportional division in the original problem
once P1’s allocated piece A is added to it.
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Proof. Clearly P1 is satisfied with A, since µ1(A) = d1. In any proportional division in I1, every
player Pi , i , 1 is guaranteed to receive a piece that is worth at least
D−µi (A)
D−d1
· di ≥ di for her in
the original instance. 
Lemma 7.2. If each player receives her demanded share in I2a and I2b , then the union of these
pieces gives a proportional division in the original problem.
Proof. We calculate the share of each player for the case when each player receives a piece
satisfying her demand in I2a and I2b .
• d1: 0 + (d1 +
d 21
D−d1
) · D−d1
D
= d1
• d j : (d j + d1) ·
d1+ε
D
+ (d j −
d1 ·(d1+ε )
D−(d1+ε )
) ·
D−(d1+ε )
D
= d j
• di , i < {1, j}: di ·
d1+ε
D
+ di ·
D−(d1+ε )
D
= di

Lemma 7.3. By slightly increasing all demands, I2b can be transformed into an instance of propor-
tional cake cuing with rational demands.
Proof. e key observation here is that there is a slack in the demands, meaning that demands
in I2b sum up to strictly below D, which is the evaluation of all players of the full cake X \A. e
sum of the demands is the following.
d1 +
d21
D − d1
+ d j −
d1 · (d1 + ε)
D − (d1 + ε)
+
∑
i<{1, j }
di =
n∑
i=1
di +
d21
D − d1
−
d1 · (d1 + ε)
D − (d1 + ε)
< D
e inequality above follows from the fact that
d 21
D−d1
<
d1(d1+ε )
D−(d1+ε )
for all ε > 0.
e slack can be distributed as extra demand among all players so that all demands are rational.
An implementation of this could be that we round up the irrational demands at a sufficiently
insignificant digit. 
Theorem 7.4. Any instance of the proportional cake cuing problem with n players and irrational
demands can be transformed into at most n − 1 proportional cake cuing problems with rational
demands and thus can be solved using a finite number of queries.
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction. For n = 2, we need to show that the problem with
irrational demands can be reduced to at most one proportional cake cuing problem with rational
demands. For two players, our protocol proceeds as follows. First P1 marks a piece X that is worth
d1 for her. Now we ask P2 to evaluate X . If µ2(A) ≤ d1, then P1 is allocated X and P2 is satisfied
with I \X , because µ2(I \X ) ≥ d2. Otherwise, if µ2(X ) = d1 + ε for some ε > 0, then P2 is allocated
X and the two players share I \ X with demands d1 +
d 21
d2
and d2 −
d1(d1+ε )
d2−ε
. ese demands ensure
a proportional share to both players, as we show in Lemma 7.2. Moreover, applying Lemma 7.3
to two players proves that they sum up to strictly below d1 + d2 and thus can be rounded up to
rational numbers, which gives us the single 2-player problem that must be solved in order to derive
a proportional division for the original problem.
Assume now that an n − 1-player proportional cake cuing problem with irrational demands
can be solved by transforming it into n − 2 proportional cake cuing problems with rational de-
mands. If we are given an n-player proportional cake cuing problem with irrational demands,
our “Proportional division with irrational demands” protocol transforms it into either I1 or to a
problem with two instances, I2a and I2b . Solving either of those problems will lead to a propor-
tional division in the original n-player problem, as Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2 show. e first instance is
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an n−1 player proportional cake cuing problemwith irrational demands, which can be solved via
n − 2 proportional cake cuing problems with rational demands by our assumption. e same is
true for I2a . As of I2b , Lemma 7.3 proves that its demands can be rounded up to rational numbers.
Even in the worst case, when our protocol generates I2a and I2b in every recursive step, it ends
up constructing n − 1 instances with rational demands. 
We would like to emphasize that even though we have transformed any proportional cake cut-
ting problem with irrational demands into a set of problems with rational demands, we did not
show any upper bound on its query complexity. When the problems with rational demands are
created, D might grow arbitrarily large, which hugely affects the query number.
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